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1.1 It is a commonplace that there are limits to the ways we can 
permissibly treat people, even in the service of good ends: we may 
not steal someone’s wallet, even if we plan to donate the contents 
to famine relief; break a promise to help a colleague move, even if 
we encounter someone else along the way whose need is somewhat 
more urgent; or harvest organs from one person to save others 
who need transplants. In other words, we should observe con-
straints against mistreating people in certain ways, where a con-
straint is a moral principle that we should not violate, even when 
that is the only way to prevent further, similar violations or other, 
greater evils. But, despite its intuitive appeal, the view that there 
are constraints has drawn considerable criticism, and attempts to 
provide a rationale for constraints have been, at best, substantially 
incomplete.1  
Discussions in the literature largely neglect a consideration that, I 
argue, is vital for fully understanding the justification and reason-
giving force of constraints: whether someone is trustworthy de-
pends largely on whether she observes constraints against mis-
treating people in certain ways.2 Once we recognize the link be-
tween constraints and trust, we can articulate an important non-
instrumental rationale for constraints. Roughly, observing con-
                                                 
* The final publication is available at 
http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.3521354.0017.004 
1 For influential criticisms of constraints, see Kagan 1989: Chs. 1, 3, and 4 
and Scheffler 1994: Ch. 4. Below, I will discuss some of the main defenses 
of constraints in the literature. 
2 One discussion of constraints that emphasizes trust is Annette Baier’s 
reading of Hume, according to which we should observe certain con-
straints, for example, a constraint against theft, because this is a means 
of producing a “climate of trust”, and thereby promoting our self-interest 
(Baier 1994a: 11). My discussion is deeply indebted to Baier. But, unlike 
Baier, I argue that constraints have non-instrumental importance; fur-
thermore, my account is as much inspired by Kant as by Hume.  
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straints is a condition for being worthy of a certain form of trust, 
which I call civic trust, and being worthy of such trust is an essen-
tial part of living with others in a form of harmony that character-
izes morally permissible interaction. 
Moral philosophers of more or less all sorts have accepted some 
version of the view that when someone observes moral principles, 
she thereby lives in a kind of harmony with others; furthermore, 
the view that appealing to some ideal of interpersonal relations is a 
promising approach to making sense of constraints has been “in 
the air for a while” (Kumar 2012). But the rationale I defend dif-
fers from accounts in the literature because it recognizes that liv-
ing with people in the relevant sort of harmony involves trusting 
them in certain ways, and, crucially, adopting actions and atti-
tudes that make it appropriate for them to trust us in certain re-
spects.3 This approach focuses on the role that observing moral 
principles plays in our psychological lives, and in the psychological 
lives of those around us.  
This emphasis on the inner life is important, I argue, because it is 
vital for making sense of certain nuanced features of constraints, 
and accounting for constraints’ reason-giving force. Furthermore, 
the approach I defend deepens our understanding of what it 
means to live with others in the kind of harmony that characteriz-
es permissible interaction – what it means, in other words, to 
make something like the Kingdom of Ends a concrete reality. So 
attending to the link between constraints and trust yields ad-
vantages on two levels: first, it helps us make better sense of the 
justification and reason-giving force of certain widely held first-
order moral judgments, and, second, it deepens our understanding 
of the familiar, plausible conception of morality to which I appeal 
to make sense of those first-order judgments.  
1.2 I can more clearly describe these advantages if I first describe 
the main aim of a rationale for constraints, namely, to explain why 
our obligation to observe principles that have the distinctive struc-
ture of constraints makes sense in light of plausible background 
                                                 
3 I argue below that living in such harmony with others involves behaving 
in ways that make it appropriate for them to trust us. In Preston-Roedder 
2013: 683-685, I argue that living in such harmony with others involves 
being disposed to trust them in certain ways.   
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claims, for example, claims about the nature and point of morality. 
Philosophers often describe the main structural feature of con-
straints by appealing to the distinction between agent-neutral and 
agent-relative principles.4 An agent-neutral principle directs eve-
ryone to whom it applies to promote the same aim, namely, pro-
ducing some good occurrence or preventing a bad one; for exam-
ple, a neutral principle that condemns coercion treats instances of 
coercion as bad occurrences and directs each of us to minimize 
such occurrences, even when this involves coercing one person in 
order to prevent others from being coerced.  
By contrast, a constraint against coercion does not treat instances 
of coercion as bad occurrences to be minimized; rather, it prohib-
its each of us from coercing people, even when coercing someone 
is the only way to minimize instances of coercion. Constraints are 
agent-relative, and a relative principle assigns a different aim to 
each person to whom it applies; for example, a prudential princi-
ple directs each person to promote her own welfare, a parental ob-
ligation directs each to care for her own children, and a constraint 
against coercion prohibits each from coercing people herself.   
The main aim of a rationale for constraints is to make constraints’ 
relativity intelligible. But, to be clear, the fact that some principle 
is agent-relative is not, by itself, problematic; many principles that 
are central to our practical deliberation are agent-relative. Rather, 
constraints have additional features that make their relativity puz-
zling. The relativity of constraints against harm does not seem to 
derive from the importance, for potential victims, of avoiding 
harm. After all, someone who observes constraints will refrain 
from doing harm, even when harming someone is the only way to 
prevent more people from being harmed. On balance, she could 
better serve potential victims’ interests by doing whatever would 
minimize the harm people suffer, and so concern for potential vic-
tims’ interests may seem to support a neutral reason to minimize 
harm, rather than a constraint.   
Nor does constraints’ relativity seem to derive from more funda-
mental agent-relative reasons to protect our own interests, or the 
interests of people we care about. After all, a constraint prohibits 
us from doing harm whether or not observing this prohibition 
                                                 
4 I use Derek Parfit’s (1984: 27) characterization of this distinction.     
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would serve our own interests, and no matter what we care about. 
But if the relativity of constraints does not derive from the im-
portance of protecting potential victims’ interests, our own inter-
ests, or the interests of people we care about, then it may be un-
clear what its source could be. The main aim of a rationale is to 
explain how there could be prohibitions against harm that both 
prohibit us from doing what would best serve others’ interests and 
bind us without regard to our particular aims.    
One thing we may hope to accomplish by articulating such a ra-
tionale is convincing those who are skeptical or agnostic about our 
obligation to observe constraints that we should, in fact, observe 
them; and my account may serve this purpose to some degree. 
However, as I will explain below, some skeptics, including some 
Act Consequentialists, would likely reject one of the background 
claims on which my account relies, and so they may not find my 
account persuasive on its own. For that matter, I do not believe 
such skeptics would be persuaded by any of the main accounts in 
the literature.  
But convincing skeptics that we should observe constraints is not 
my main motivation for articulating a rationale. Rather, I wish to 
make clearer, especially to agnostics and to those who already be-
lieve we should observe constraints, how constraints fit together 
with other practical principles, and with other values that have 
great moral significance. That is, I want to illuminate connections, 
which have been overlooked, between constraints and these other 
principles and values; and I wish to do this in a way that not only 
makes constraints’ relativity intelligible, but also helps us better 
understand (1) the justification of other, more nuanced features of 
constraints (2) the reason-giving force of constraints and (3) the 
familiar conception of morality to which my account appeals.  
1.3. There have been many attempts to make sense of constraints, 
and some of these attempts deepen our understanding of con-
straints, for example, by making their relativity more intelligible. 
But my account supplies part of the story that has been over-
looked, and it thereby addresses important shortcomings of the 
main accounts in the literature.  
One familiar approach to making sense of constraints is the Rule 
Consequentialist approach, which states that we should follow the 
principles adherence to which would produce the best results, and 
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that these principles include constraints.5 I believe this approach 
supplies part of the rationale for constraints; nevertheless, our 
reason to observe constraints does not seem to depend primarily 
on the benefits we thereby produce. Suppose it turns out that our 
accepting a permission to imprison, without trial, people who are 
suspected of having committed violent crimes would produce 
somewhat better results, overall, than accepting a constraint 
against such imprisonment. Many judge that we should neverthe-
less observe the constraint; that is, the rationale for constraints 
seems to have an important non-instrumental component. This is 
the possibility I wish to explore. 
There are also non-instrumental accounts of constraints in the lit-
erature. But even the most promising among them have important 
shortcomings: some lack resources needed to make sense of con-
straints’ nuanced features, some rest on highly implausible as-
sumptions, and some neglect aspects of moral life to which we 
must appeal to fully grasp constraints’ reason-giving force. Below, 
I will explain how my account fills important gaps left by these 
non-instrumental approaches.6  
My account makes constraints intelligible by identifying a morally 
significant relation that someone bears to people when, and only 
when, she observes certain constraints against mistreating them; 
and it characterizes this relation in a way that helps explain, in 
light of claims about the nature and point of morality, why it 
makes sense for a moral theory to include those constraints. The 
account rests partly on the view that it is sometimes reasonable for 
people to pursue their own private aims, rather than promote the 
greater good. For my purposes, claiming that someone’s conduct is 
reasonable means that she has sufficient reason to adopt it, all 
things considered; and judgments concerning what it is reasonable 
take into account not only the agent’s reasons to promote her own 
interests, but also reasons that derive from others’ interests. It 
may be reasonable, in this sense, for someone to pursue a career 
she finds fulfilling, even if she could do more good by taking a 
                                                 
5 See Hart 1961: 190-195 and Hooker 2000: Ch. 6.  
6 Recent non-instrumental accounts include Hurley 2009: Ch. 6; Kamm 
1996: Ch. 10 and 2007: Chs. 1, 5, and 8; Kumar 1999: 304-309; Nagel 
1995: 83-93; and Quinn 1993a.  
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more lucrative job and donating her surplus income to famine re-
lief.   
Though people can reasonably devote some special attention to 
their private aims, someone who observes moral requirements 
thereby limits her choice and pursuit of her own aims in ways that 
bring her life into a kind of harmony with other people’s lives, pro-
vided that these others pursue reasonable aims by reasonable 
means. In other words, whatever further features they possess, 
moral requirements must be such that anyone who observes them 
thereby lives in substantial harmony with other people who pursue 
reasonable aims by reasonable means, even if those people’s aims 
conflict, in limited respects, with hers. The view that interpersonal 
harmony characterizes morally permissible interaction is more or 
less universally accepted, in some form or other, and when it is 
properly understood, it forms the basis of the rationale I defend.  
I argue that one condition someone must satisfy to live in such 
harmony with people is being worthy of their civic trust; roughly, 
she must behave in ways that make it appropriate for others to in-
teract with her without fear, and to pursue their aims openly when 
they are around her. Provided that people can sometimes reasona-
bly pursue their private aims, rather than promote the good, 
someone can be worthy of their civic trust only if she observes cer-
tain constraints against mistreating them. Since moral require-
ments must be such that anyone who observes them lives in har-
mony with others, it follows that these requirements must include 
constraints.    
My task is to supply the main details needed to defend this ra-
tionale. In Section 2, I will discuss the importance of trust in social 
life, and explain more fully what it means to have civic trust in 
others and to be worthy of such trust oneself. In Section 3, I will 
discuss the connection between trustworthiness and constraints, 
arguing that – given some intuitively plausible assumptions – 
someone can be worthy of people’s civic trust only if she observes 
certain constraints against mistreating them. In Section 4, I will 
discuss the basis of the rationale; that is, I will clarify and defend 
the view that when someone observes moral requirements, she 
lives in a kind of harmony with others, and I will explain more ful-
ly how to move from this virtual platitude to the judgment that we 
should observe constraints. Finally, in Section 5, I will briefly de-
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velop my claim that each of the main accounts of constraints in the 
literature leaves out some important element of the rationale for 
constraints, an element that my account supplies.  
2 
2.1 Many of the projects and relationships that make life worth 
living flourish only in an atmosphere of trust. Trust is an essential 
part of the personal relationships that one finds in a good life. For 
example, the relationship between parents and children cannot 
thrive unless children trust their parents to support and protect 
them in certain ways, and parents trust their children, to some de-
gree, to avoid certain dangers. Trust is also an essential part of 
good friendships. Friends tend to reveal private thoughts and feel-
ings to each other, and each pursues ends that the friends share. 
So a friendship cannot thrive unless each friend trusts the other to 
refrain from belittling her ideas, undermining her private inter-
ests, or frustrating their shared ends.   
Furthermore, to lead good lives, we must trust not only people 
who are close to us, but also people we do not know. Our flourish-
ing depends partly on our capacity to trust the countless strangers 
we encounter every day; for example, riding the subway would be 
intolerable if we could not trust our fellow passengers, for the 
most part, not to steal our belongings or push us onto the tracks. 
Our flourishing also depends on our capacity to trust distant 
strangers whose behavior we could not monitor if we wanted to. 
We could not live in peace if we could not trust such strangers, for 
the most part, not to plant bombs on busy streets or poison our 
water supply.   
Annette Baier (1994b: 95-110 and 1994c: 130-151) argues, plausi-
bly, that the forms of trust that are most central to social life in-
volve relying on people’s goodwill toward us, rather than relying, 
say, on vigilance or threats, to ensure that those people do not 
harm us. For example, insofar as someone trusts his spouse to re-
main faithful, he will not interrogate her friends about her where-
abouts, or threaten to abuse her if she has an affair. Rather, he will 
rely on her love for him to ensure that she remains faithful. And 
insofar as a parent trusts her teenager to make fairly responsible 
decisions, she will grant him some limited domain within which he 
can shape his own life, without interference. When we trust people 
in this way, we accept vulnerability to their power to harm us. So, 
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when the husband trusts his spouse, he accepts vulnerability to 
her power to make a fool of him, and to jeopardize a relationship 
that matters to him; and when the parent trusts her son, she ac-
cepts vulnerability to his power to cause her emotional anguish, 
and to squander opportunities that she struggled to provide for 
him.  
2.2 These brief remarks leave us well placed to identify a form of 
trust, namely, civic trust, that someone makes appropriate when 
she observes certain constraints against harm; and they leave us 
well placed to appreciate respects in which our having such trust 
in one another, and being worthy of such trust ourselves, is moral-
ly significant. Roughly, someone who has civic trust in people is 
unafraid to interact with them, and she is open, or in other words, 
unguarded, in her dealings with them. She tends to pursue hob-
bies, cultivate relationships, engage in cultural or religious prac-
tices, and carry out her other projects – in short, she tends to live 
her life – without being wary or fearful. More precisely, someone 
who has civic trust in people is willing and unafraid (1) to interact 
with them, even if she is vulnerable to harm they might cause, and 
(2) to rely on their goodwill toward her – as opposed to relying on 
secrecy, force, or constant vigilance – to ensure that they do not 
use whatever they know about her in ways that harm her. Some-
one is worthy of civic trust just in case her character, which com-
prises entrenched dispositions of action, deliberation, and emo-
tional response, does not, by itself, make it inappropriate for peo-
ple to have such trust in her.   
To be clear, when Baier claims that certain familiar forms of trust 
involve relying on people’s goodwill toward us, she uses “goodwill” 
to refer to people’s concern for us; by contrast, when I claim that 
civic trust involves relying on people’s goodwill, I use that term 
more broadly, to refer either to people’s concern or to their respect 
for us. To be worthy of people’s civic trust, we must adopt prohibi-
tions against mistreating them in certain ways, and limit our con-
duct and deliberation in accord with those prohibitions. We there-
by grant people’s interests considerable weight in our practical de-
liberation, exhibiting what Stephen Darwall calls “recognition re-
spect” for them (Darwall 1977: 38). 
Civic trust comprises two sets of attitudes and behaviors, which 
may come apart, and it will help to consider each separately. First, 
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someone who has civic trust in people is unafraid to interact with 
them, despite vulnerability to harm they might cause. She may be 
unafraid, say, to ride a city bus with them or stand in line with 
them in a crowded market. Such freedom from fear is appropriate 
just in case interacting with these people would not raise her total 
risk of being harmed, or suffering some other loss.   
Second, someone who has such trust in people accepts vulnerabil-
ity to their power to use what they know about her mind, body, or 
property in ways that make her worse off. She trusts people not 
only to refrain from raising her total risk of being harmed, but also 
to refrain from using what they know about her in ways that harm 
her. Such knowledge includes knowledge of her private thoughts 
and commitments, which others can acquire only by spending 
time with her, or with people who know her well. Beyond this, it 
includes knowledge of less personal facts, like the fact that she re-
cently withdrew money from an ATM or that her drinking water 
comes from a certain reservoir, which others can acquire by ob-
serving her at the right moment, or by doing some research. And it 
includes knowledge of facts that may be derived from wholly gen-
eral claims about human biology or psychology, like the fact that a 
sharp blow to the head may render her unconscious, or that she is 
unlikely to notice that a pickpocket is taking her wallet if his ac-
complice is distracting her.  
This characterization implies that someone can be worthy of peo-
ple’s civic trust even if she is willing to harm them in certain lim-
ited ways. I can begin to explain which dispositions to harm make 
someone unworthy of civic trust, and which do not, if I compare 
two cases. First, imagine someone who steals from people when he 
wants something they possess and he is unlikely to get caught. Be-
cause he steals deliberately, for his own benefit, this person is un-
worthy of people’s civic trust in both of two possible respects. That 
is, because he steals to promote his own interests, people raise 
their risk of suffering a loss when they interact with him, and so 
they have reason to avoid him, or fear that they will lose some-
thing valuable if they interact with him. Furthermore, this person 
is willing to use what he knows about people, for instance, the fact 
that someone’s wallet is lying on a counter, or the fact that some-
one left her laptop in an unlocked office, to promote his own inter-
ests at their expense. So people have reason to prevent him from 
learning what valuable goods they possess and how these goods 
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may be reached, and they have reason to rely on vigilance or force 
to prevent him from using such knowledge when he acquires it. 
By contrast, imagine that police are trying to capture a violent 
criminal who has fled, by car, from a crime scene. If the officers 
engage in a high-speed chase, they are likely to catch the criminal, 
but they might injure a bystander or damage a bystander’s proper-
ty during the pursuit. But if the officers do not engage in a high-
speed chase, the criminal is likely to escape, and he may go on to 
commit additional violent crimes. Imagine that the officers are 
willing to engage in such a chase, despite the risk to bystanders, 
provided that this risk is “proportional” to the good they reasona-
bly expect to accomplish.  
The fact that the officers are so willing does not, by itself, make 
them less worthy of people’s civic trust. Because the officers are 
willing to put bystanders at risk in this way only when this is nec-
essary to secure greater benefits – in this case, capturing a violent 
criminal – this aspect of their characters does not, on balance, 
raise anyone’s risk of being injured or suffering some other loss. 
So it does not give anyone reason, say, to try to prevent these offic-
ers from remaining part of the police force, or to worry if the offic-
ers get assigned to her district.  
Furthermore, the officers are not disposed to use what they know 
about anyone’s physical vulnerabilities, property, and so on in 
ways that harm her. For example, when they decide whether to 
engage in a high-speed chase, they treat the fact that the chase 
would expose some bystander to the risk of bodily injury or prop-
erty damage solely as a reason not to pursue the criminal. Of 
course, this reason may not be decisive, whether it is considered 
on its own or together with their reasons to avoid exposing other 
bystanders to such risks. Nevertheless, it functions solely as a bar-
rier to the pursuit. So no one has reason to avoid trusting these 
officers with facts concerning, say, her location or the value of her 
property, which the officers might use to help determine whether 
to pursue the criminal. More generally, the fact that the officers 
are willing to expose people to risks in this limited way does not, 
by itself, give anyone reason to prevent the officers from learning 
facts about her mind, body, or property; nor does it give anyone 
reason to prevent the officers from using such facts to carry out 
their aims. Below, I will describe in more detail ways in which 
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someone can be willing to harm people, while remaining worthy of 
their civic trust.  
2.3 Civic trust and civic trustworthiness are both valuable rela-
tions. We have agent-neutral reasons to form communities whose 
members have such trust in one another. But we also have agent-
relative reasons to be worthy of civic trust, whether or not this 
leads others to trust us; and some of these relative reasons are 
central to my rationale for constraints. The agent-neutral value of 
civic trust derives from the role that such trust plays in making life 
in a community worth living. People who have civic trust in one 
another are unafraid to live and work together, and a community 
thrives only if its members are, to a considerable degree, free from 
such fear. In Samuel Scheffler’s words, fear “dominates” people, 
drawing their attention to the risk of injury or loss, and away from 
goods they might otherwise enjoy (Scheffler 2006: 4). Fear also 
isolates people, leading each to limit her contact with others or, in 
some cases, to withdraw from society almost entirely.7 So fear not 
only prevents communities from thriving, but also, sometimes, 
prevents people from maintaining communities at all.  
Someone who has civic trust in people also trusts them with 
knowledge of her activities, whereabouts, physical vulnerabilities, 
and so on. We cannot always prevent people from acquiring such 
knowledge, unless we withdraw from society altogether; and if we 
remain in society, the alternatives to such trust are grim. Someone 
who lacks civic trust in people around her might, as far as possible, 
pursue her aims in secret, working to prevent others from learning 
where she is, what she does, or what goods she possesses. She 
might use force to ensure that when people do learn something 
about her, they cannot use what they learn in ways that harm her. 
Or she might monitor people constantly to determine what they 
know about her and what they plan to do with this knowledge. In 
short, if members of a community lack civic trust in one another, 
they avoid living their lives openly, and each must endure a form 
of loneliness.     
                                                 
7 Such considerations lead Hobbes to list “continual fear” among the 
“worst of all” the hardships that people endure in the state of nature 
(Hobbes 1651: Ch. 13, para. 9). Frederick Douglass, in an account of his 
escape from slavery, vividly describes the “great insecurity and loneli-
ness” associated with such fear (Douglass 1994: 89 and 90).  
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We not only have agent-neutral reasons to promote civic trust, but 
also have agent-relative reasons to be worthy of such trust. Some 
of these relative reasons are instrumental, deriving from the im-
portance, for each agent, of causing others to believe that she is 
trustworthy, and to treat her accordingly. But we also have relative 
reasons to be worthy of civic trust for its own sake, whether or not 
this leads others to trust us; and my argument rests on these non-
instrumental reasons. We have these reasons because being wor-
thy of civic trust is, by itself, an important part of living in a kind 
of harmony with others. In other words, if someone is unworthy of 
such trust, her character might give people reason to avoid her, or 
to worry that they will suffer a net loss when they share a park 
bench with her or stand in line with her at an ATM. Or it may give 
people reason to threaten her, hide from her, or monitor her to 
prevent her from using what she knows about them in ways that 
harm them. In short, she forms a gulf between herself and people 
around her, and being cut off from others in this way is, by itself, 
undesirable.   
By contrast, if someone is worthy of civic trust, her character 
makes it appropriate for people in her community to ride a city 
bus with her or walk beside her in a public park, without worrying 
that they will suffer a net loss as a result. And her character makes 
it appropriate for these people to exhibit a kind of openness: they 
can appropriately live their lives without working constantly to 
prevent her from learning where they are or what they are doing, 
or from using such knowledge in ways that hurt them. In short, 
she lives in a kind of harmony with others. This harmony need not 
involve people’s believing that she is trustworthy and treating her 
accordingly; rather, it is a normative relation that obtains just in 
case her character makes it appropriate for people to trust her in 
the ways I just described. 
Living in such harmony with others is an essential part of interact-
ing with them in a morally permissible way. It is morally desirable 
in itself, quite apart from whatever benefits it produces; indeed, 
the fact that someone who observes moral principles thereby lives 
in such harmony with others helps explain why observing such 
principles is worth caring about – why it is not just a matter of fol-
lowing pointless rules. In Section 4, I will develop the view that 
living in harmony with others is morally significant, and I will ex-
plain more clearly how this view provides the basis of a rationale 
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for certain constraints. But first, I will clarify the link between ob-
serving constraints and being trustworthy.   
3 
3.1 Our trustworthiness generally depends on the principles, or 
policies, that we observe. I argue that, to be worthy of people’s civ-
ic trust, one must observe certain constraints against mistreating 
them. This is an argument about the kind of person someone must 
be in order to make it appropriate for others to feel and behave in 
certain ways, and so it relies on background claims about how 
people have reason to feel and behave. In particular, it relies on 
the intuitively plausible judgment that it is sometimes reasonable 
for people to pursue their private aims, rather than promote the 
greater good. To be clear, this is not the moral claim that people 
are sometimes morally permitted to pursue their private aims, but 
rather, the non-moral claim that they sometimes have sufficient 
reason to do so, all things considered.8 It is possible, though rare, 
for someone to accept this latter claim, and nevertheless judge that 
people are always morally required to promote a single, overriding 
aim, say, the aim of securing the greatest happiness for the great-
est number.9    
To understand why my argument relies on this claim, consider two 
cases: First, suppose, contrary to what I believe, that people al-
ways have decisive reason to produce the best available results, 
impersonally considered. Now imagine that Jones does not ob-
serve any constraints; rather, he observes agent-neutral principles 
that always permit him to do whatever is needed to produce the 
best results, even when this involves harming one person to pre-
vent others from being harmed.   
It may be that, when someone recognizes that Jones is willing to 
harm her in order to help others, she will be afraid to interact with 
him. But, given that she always has decisive reason to promote the 
good, it is inappropriate for her to fear him, avoid him, or avoid 
trusting him with knowledge that he might use to harm her. In 
other words, if people always have decisive reason to do whatever 
is necessary to promote the good, then they have decisive reason 
                                                 
8 For a recent defense of this claim, see Scheffler 2010.     
9 See Sidgwick 1907: Concluding Chapter.   
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to sacrifice their own interests whenever this will produce the best 
results. So Jones’ willingness to harm people for the greater good 
does not, by itself, give them reason to avoid him, or to prevent 
him from using what he knows about them to carry out his aims.   
By contrast, suppose it is sometimes reasonable for people to 
promote their private aims, and imagine, again, that Jones does 
not observe constraints against harm. In this second scenario, 
when someone reasonably pursues her own aims, it does not make 
sense, other things equal, for her to allow Jones to harm her, 
whether or not the harm is somehow necessary to produce the best 
results, impersonally considered. Put another way, there are cases 
where Jones’ harming someone to promote the good would pre-
vent that person from achieving some private aim that she reason-
ably pursues. In such cases, it would not make sense for Jones’ po-
tential victim simply to let Jones harm her. Rather, she might have 
reason to avoid Jones or to prevent him from learning where she is 
or how her property may be reached, and she has reason to be 
vigilant in order to prevent him from using such knowledge in 
ways that harm her. So the fact that Jones is willing to harm peo-
ple in such cases makes him unworthy of their civic trust.   
To be clear, Jones is untrustworthy, even if his willingness to harm 
one person in order to save others lowers everyone’s risk of harm. 
Of course, if Jones’ adherence to his principles lowers people’s risk 
of harm, it does not give them reason to worry that they will suffer 
a net loss if they interact with him. Furthermore, if Jones becomes 
better able to help people as he learns more about their needs, 
then they have reason to let him learn about certain of their vul-
nerabilities, rather than living, as far as possible, in total secrecy. 
Nevertheless, anyone who does not wish to be sacrificed for the 
greater good also has reason to be discriminating in what she lets 
Jones learn about her. She has reason to prevent him from learn-
ing where she is, what she does, and so on when he is better able 
to use such knowledge to harm her than to help her; and even 
when she has reason to let Jones learn something about her, she 
has reason to rely on force or vigilance to ensure that he does not 
use this knowledge in ways that make her worse off. So, even when 
it makes sense for someone to give Jones information about her 
mind, body, or property, it does not make sense for her to trust 
him with it. 
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Given that people can reasonably promote certain private aims, 
one cannot be worthy of their civic trust if one is willing to do to 
them whatever is necessary to produce the best results. Rather, to 
be worthy of people’s civic trust, one must observe certain agent-
relative prohibitions against mistreating them. More precisely, one 
must observe three different prohibitions against harm, including 
two constraints; and, together, these prohibitions capture what I 
believe to be the central intuitions about the content of constraints 
against harm.10     
First, to be worthy of civic trust, one must observe a prohibition 
against doing non-optimal harm, or in other words, harm that is 
not needed to produce the best results. This principle prohibits us 
from doing harm to others to promote our private aims, and from 
showing callous indifference to harm that our behavior may cause. 
To be clear, this principle is not, by itself, a constraint; to the con-
trary, it may be derived from the Act Consequentialist requirement 
that we always do what will produce the best results. But it is un-
surprising that considerations that justify constraints – which 
sometimes prohibit harm that is necessary to promote the good – 
also justify a prohibition against non-optimal harm.     
To show that observing this principle is a condition for being wor-
thy of civic trust, I will consider someone who fails to observe it, 
and then determine how her willingness to violate the principle 
shapes her relation to others. Such a person may be willing to tar-
nish a colleague’s reputation to advance her own career, or she 
may tend to hurt people’s feelings or damage their belongings out 
of carelessness. Other things equal, her character gives people rea-
son to restrain her or stay out of her way, and when people cannot 
avoid her, they have reason to worry that they will suffer a net loss 
as a result. So, when someone is willing to do harm that is not nec-
essary to promote the good, this makes her unworthy of civic trust.    
Second, to be worthy of civic trust, one must observe a constraint 
against intending harm, whether to promote one’s own aims or to 
promote the greater good. To intend harm is to do harm or allow it 
to occur, either because the occurrence of harm is one’s end or be-
cause it is a means of achieving one’s end. When someone intends 
                                                 
10 As I will explain below, these prohibitions make exceptions for certain 
kinds of harm.  
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harm, she aims to produce the harm, and this aim guides her con-
duct and deliberation. For example, someone who hurts a class-
mate’s feelings to boost his own self-esteem intends the class-
mate’s psychological distress as a means of promoting his own 
wellbeing. By contrast, consider a teacher who points out a mis-
take in her student’s work in order to help him understand an as-
signment, even though this will embarrass him. She does not in-
tend to cause him distress; rather, the student’s distress is a fore-
seeable, but regrettable, side effect of her attempt to help.     
Imagine someone who does not observe any constraint against in-
tending harm – someone who will deliberately harm people, or 
allow them to be harmed, to achieve certain goals. To isolate the 
significance of her willingness to intend harm, as opposed to her 
willingness to do non-optimal harm, imagine that she intends 
harm only as a means of promoting the good. Even with this quali-
fication, her willingness to intend harm makes her unworthy of 
civic trust. As she learns more about where people are, what goods 
they possess, and so on, she becomes better able to carry out her 
aim of harming them to promote the good; and so people who 
wish to avoid harm have reason to prevent her from acquiring 
such knowledge, or to use force or vigilance to prevent her from 
using it in ways that make them worse off.   
To be clear, someone’s trustworthiness may be undermined not 
only by her willingness to do harm deliberately, but also by her 
willingness to let harm occur, either because it is her end or be-
cause it is a means of achieving her end. Consider a doctor who is 
willing to let one patient die to provide organs for others who need 
transplants, and imagine that she learns that some patient, who 
has healthy organs, will die unless he receives treatment. The doc-
tor will treat the fact that this patient has healthy organs, which 
can be used to aid others after he dies, as a justification for with-
holding treatment, and for avoiding conduct that would lead oth-
ers to provide treatment. So it makes sense for patients to monitor 
her to determine how she uses such knowledge, and to use threats 
or coercion to prevent her from using such knowledge to justify 
letting them die. 
Viewing the constraint against intending harm as a principle that  
someone must observe to be worthy of civic trust enables us to ad-
dress an important difficulty in formulating that constraint: many 
  
17 
 
instances of intending harm can be described in such a way that, 
strictly speaking, the harm is merely foreseen, rather than intend-
ed.11 Consider the familiar case where someone has life-
threatening complications during labor. If the doctor performs a 
craniotomy, crushing the child’s head, she will save the mother’s 
life; otherwise, the child can be delivered unharmed, but the 
mother will die. Suppose the doctor performs the craniotomy. On 
the one hand, it seems that she intentionally kills the child to save 
the mother. On the other hand, one might claim that, strictly 
speaking, she does not intend to kill the child; rather, she intends 
to crush the child’s head, and the death is merely a foreseen side 
effect. But, if we can deliberately crush someone’s head without 
intending harm, then a constraint against intending harm is not 
nearly as morally significant as it initially appears to be.  
One response to this difficulty is to insist that the doctor’s aim of 
crushing the child’s head is so closely related to the resulting death 
that, for purposes of moral evaluation, both should be considered 
part of her aim.12 But, whether or not we accept this response, the 
constraint against intending harm that someone must observe to 
be worthy of civic trust avoids this problem. If someone is willing 
to crush people’s skulls, whether to achieve her private aims or to 
promote the good, this gives people reason to fear her, avoid her, 
or prevent her from using what she knows about them to promote 
her aims. Her willingness to treat people this way makes her un-
trustworthy. We might say, adapting a formulation from Warren 
Quinn, that to be worthy of civic trust, someone must observe a 
constraint that not only prohibits her from intending harm, but 
also prohibits her from intentionally involving people in her pur-
suits in ways that result in their being harmed (Quinn 1993b).13 
                                                 
11 See Bennett 1995: Ch. 11, Foot 2003: 21, McMahan 1994, and Quinn 
1993b.  
12 See Foot 2003: 21-22.  
13 This does not mean that if the doctor performs the craniotomy, she 
thereby violates a constraint against intending harm. Constraints make 
exceptions for certain types of harm, and it may be that the constraint 
makes an exception for the craniotomy, say, because the child threatens 
the mother’s life. My point is that deliberately crushing someone’s head 
is the sort of act that this constraint ordinarily prohibits, whether or not 
one intends harm in some strict sense. 
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But, for ease of expression, I will describe this principle as a con-
straint against intending harm.   
Third, to be worthy of civic trust, one must observe a constraint 
against doing harm that is a causal means, as opposed to a causal 
side effect, of promoting the good. This means that, on my ac-
count, both the distinction between intending and foreseeing harm 
and the distinction between doing and allowing harm are morally 
significant. As Shelly Kagan (1989: 87) notes, advocates of the one 
distinction often deny that the other distinction has any signifi-
cance, but this seems misguided, because both distinctions are in-
tuitively important. So the fact that my account provides a unified 
rationale for both distinctions is an advantage of the account.  
Although intending harm and doing harm as a causal means are 
superficially similar, they are importantly distinct, and they can 
come apart. Someone who intends harm aims to produce harm, 
either as an end or as a means of achieving her end; but someone 
who does harm that serves as a causal means of producing some 
result need not aim at the harm or the result. The distinction be-
tween intending and foreseeing harm concerns an agent’s aims, 
while the distinction between doing harm as a causal means and 
doing harm as a causal side effect concerns the role the harm plays 
in a causal chain leading from an agent to a result.  
We can isolate the significance of someone’s willingness to harm 
as a causal means if we consider someone who is willing to do such 
harm just in case that harm is unintended. Imagine that a nurse 
cares for a terminally ill patient who, despite his considerable 
pain, would value additional months of life. The nurse learns that 
a drug she administers to manage this patient’s pain may hasten 
the patient’s death, and that an alternative treatment would pro-
vide comparable pain relief without the associated risk. But, since 
the nurse is uncomfortable confronting the aggressive doctor who 
prescribed the drug, she decides not to pursue the matter, and to 
keep giving the potentially dangerous drug to her patient. Because 
some of the patient’s vital organs have not yet been affected by his 
illness, they may be used, if he dies relatively quickly, to save oth-
ers who need transplants. But making donor organs available is 
not among the nurse’s aims; rather, she just wants to avoid an un-
pleasant confrontation with the doctor.  
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I can draw on my earlier discussion to show that the nurse’s will-
ingness to administer the drug, despite the risk to her patient, 
makes her unworthy of civic trust. Roughly, principles that permit 
the nurse to administer this drug are of two sorts, and observing 
principles of either sort makes one untrustworthy. On the one 
hand, the nurse’s principle may permit her to do non-optimal 
harm. I explained above why observing such a principle makes 
someone untrustworthy. On the other hand, the principle might 
permit the nurse to harm people, provided that the harm would 
serve as a causal means of promoting the good. If the nurse ob-
serves this second type of principle, she treats the fact that some 
action, say, giving some drug to a patient, would cause harm as a 
defeasible reason not to perform it. So far, so good. But if that 
harm would somehow produce good results, she treats this further 
fact as a justification for doing harm. For example, when she 
learns that her patient has healthy organs, which may be used to 
save lives if he dies, she treats this as a justification for giving this 
patient a potentially lethal drug. So patients who have healthy or-
gans, or other resources that may be used to help needy people if 
they die, have reason to prevent the nurse from learning that they 
have such resources, or to use vigilance or threats to prevent her 
from using such knowledge to justify conduct that would harm 
them. 
3.2 Recognizing the link between constraints and trust, and ap-
pealing to this link to make sense of the structure of constraints, 
enables us to respond to one of the main challenges that accounts 
of constraints face. Typically, constraints prohibit us from doing or 
intending harm to others, but they make exceptions, the most im-
portant of which concern harm to people who reasonably consent 
to being harmed, harm in self-defense, and unintended harm that 
is a causal side effect, as opposed to a causal means, of promoting 
the good. So an intuitively plausible account of constraints must 
accommodate the view that constraints do not prohibit these types 
of harm. Applied to my account, this challenge takes the following 
form: my account rests on the view that, when someone acts right-
ly, she lives in a kind of harmony with others, where this involves 
being worthy of their civic trust; and so, to make room for excep-
tions to constraints against harm, I must show that someone can 
be worthy of people’s civic trust, even if she is willing to do or in-
tend relevant types of harm to them. 
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Turning first to consent, someone’s willingness to harm people 
who reasonably consents to being harmed does not, by itself, make 
her untrustworthy. A clerk might sell cigarettes to someone who 
knows that smoking may cause cancer, but is willing to take the 
risk; a doctor might perform a preventive mastectomy on a patient 
who wishes to reduce her considerable risk of developing breast 
cancer; or someone might engage in limited forms of sexual sado-
masochism with a willing partner. In such cases, someone’s will-
ingness to harm another person amounts to willingness to pro-
mote aims that, we can suppose, the other reasonably shares; and 
so her willingness to harm does not, by itself, give others reason to 
fear her, avoid her, or avoid trusting her with facts, say, about 
their bodies or property, that she might use to promote her aims.  
It is more complicated to explain why someone’s willingness to 
harm in self-defense need not make her untrustworthy. The fact 
that constraints make exceptions for harm in self-defense, includ-
ing, perhaps, harm to morally blameless attackers, is among the 
least tractable features of constraints, and I do not have space to 
discuss this complicated topic here. So, although I believe this ap-
proach can help make sense of exceptions for harm in self-defense, 
I must set this issue aside. 
Finally, consider the exception for doing unintended harm as a 
causal side effect of promoting the good. One widely discussed 
case to which this exception applies is the Trolley Case: a runaway 
trolley hurtles toward five workers who are repairing the tracks, 
and it will kill all five unless a bystander flips a switch that sends it 
to an alternate track, where it will kill one lone worker instead. 
Many judge that the bystander is permitted to turn the trolley, 
provided that her aim is to save the five, and killing the lone work-
er is merely a regrettable side effect. But, because the lone worker 
is an innocent person who wishes to live, defenders of constraints 
against doing harm, as opposed to intending it, have found it noto-
riously difficult to explain why the bystander is permitted to cause 
his death.14   
Imagine that the bystander turns the trolley, and that causing the 
lone worker’s death is merely a regrettable side effect, not part of 
                                                 
14 For attempts to meet this challenge, see Foot 2003: 23; Kamm 1996: 
Chs. 6-7 and 2007: Ch. 5; Quinn 1993a; and Thomson 1976, 1985, and 
1990: Ch. 7. 
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her aim. Provided that she observes the three prohibitions I de-
scribed above, her willingness to harm people in cases like this, 
where the harm is an unintended result of promoting the good, 
does not make her untrustworthy. Because she observes a prohibi-
tion against doing non-optimal harm, she does not give transit 
workers any reason to worry, say, that they will suffer net losses if 
they repair the tracks at her local station. Because she observes a 
prohibition against intending harm, they need not worry that she 
will use what she learns about them to serve her aim of harming 
them. Finally, because she is willing to harm only as a causal side-
effect, not as a causal means, of promoting the good, she does not 
treat the fact someone has a resource, which may be used to help 
others if he is harmed, as a justification for harming him. So the 
bystander’s character does not give transit workers any reason to 
prevent her from learning where they are, what jobs they perform, 
or anything else she might use to determine whether her actions 
might harm them. Nor does her character give them reason to rely 
on force or threats to prevent her from using such knowledge to 
justify harmful behavior. To the contrary, each worker, including 
the one who ends up on the alternate track, has strong reasons to 
ensure that the bystander knows facts about his location, his phys-
ical vulnerabilities, and so on, which might help her determine 
whether her actions would harm him; and it is appropriate for 
each worker to trust the bystander with such knowledge.  
Of course, the bystander may seem to treat one fact about the lone 
worker, not as a barrier to turning the trolley, but rather as a justi-
fication for doing so: the fact that he is alone on the alternate 
track. But the claim that some worker is alone runs together two 
considerations that, in this context, are importantly distinct. The 
first, namely, that the worker is on the track, concerns that very 
worker’s location and vulnerability, but the second, namely, that 
no one else is on the track, concerns everyone else’s location and 
vulnerability. Someone is worthy of civic trust when and because 
her character makes it appropriate for everyone around her to live 
his own life openly, without hiding facts about his own mind, 
body, or property from her, and without working to prevent her 
from using such facts to carry out her aims. This is the sense in 
which being worthy of someone’s civic trust is part of living in 
harmony with that person. When the bystander decides whether 
to turn the trolley, and thereby cause some worker’s death, she 
treats every relevant fact about that worker’s mind, body, and 
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property as a reason not to turn it. So her willingness to turn the 
trolley does not give that worker, or anyone else, reason to avoid 
trusting her in relevant respects.15 
I should add that, although the literature on this third exception 
focuses almost entirely on versions of the Trolley Case, there are 
other cases that have the same structure, and to which the excep-
tion applies. For example, officials might have to decide whether 
to allow a flood or wildfire to remain on its present course, or to 
direct it to another course, where it will harm fewer people. And 
Jonathan Glover describes a fascinating historical case with this 
structure: During World War II, British agents gained an oppor-
tunity to deceive the German military about the accuracy of their 
rocket attacks on London. Though the agents were not able to pre-
vent the attacks altogether, they had the power to divert the rock-
ets to less densely populated areas (Glover 1977: 102-103).16 The 
same considerations that explain why someone who is worthy of 
                                                 
15 Though my own intuitions about other, more complicated versions of 
the Trolley Case are not robust, many believe that the bystander is per-
mitted to turn the trolley in Judith Thomson’s Loop Case (Thomson 
1985). In the Loop Case, as in the original Trolley Case, a runaway trolley 
will kill five people unless a bystander sends it to a side track; but, unlike 
the Trolley Case, the side track loops around to rejoin the main track. If 
there were no obstructions on the side track, there would be no reason to 
turn the trolley – it would simply loop around and hit the five from the 
other side. But there is one person on the side track, and if the trolley 
gets diverted, it will hit this person and stop. My approach may be unable 
to accommodate a permission to turn the trolley in the Loop Case, but I 
do not consider this a serious objection. Michael Otsuka points out that, 
unlike the original Trolley Case, “looping cases are not modeled after any 
real-word cases with which we are familiar and about which we have al-
ready formed reactions”, and he appeals to some ingenious cases to ex-
plain away the intuition that turning the trolley is permissible in the Loop 
Case (Otsuka 2008: 109). Because my intuitions about the Loop Case and 
other, similarly complicated cases are not robust, and because the ra-
tionale I defend is intuitively plausible, I am content to let this rationale 
to guide my thinking about such cases.       
16 Warren Quinn (1993a: note 30) points out the similarity between this 
case and the Trolley Case. 
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civic trust may be willing to harm in the Trolley Case explain why 
she may be willing to harm in these other cases.17  
3.3 In addition to making sense of these exceptions to constraints, 
my account can respond to another challenge that faces views, like 
mine, that aim to make constraints intelligible by appealing to the 
significance of interpersonal harmony. Such views must accom-
modate the judgment that we can permissibly engage in certain 
forms of competition, say, for jobs or awards, even though such 
competition seems initially to constitute a form of discord. In par-
ticular, my account, which grounds a rationale for constraints in 
the importance of being trustworthy, must accommodate the 
judgment that people engaged in certain forms of competition are 
permitted to act in ways that make them unworthy of competitors’ 
trust in limited respects. Imagine that Smith lives in a community 
where many struggle to find work. Smith is permitted to apply for 
local jobs and present himself in a favorable light to potential em-
ployers. But his willingness to do this gives others reason to worry 
that he will take some job that they desperately need, and to avoid 
revealing facts about their own qualifications, which he might use 
to gain a competitive advantage.18 
                                                 
17 An anonymous reviewer pointed out that, because our duty to observe 
constraints against harm is a correlate of people’s moral right not to be 
harmed, this duty has another important structural feature: it is directed 
– we owe it to people to observe these constraints. I do not have space to 
discuss this directionality in detail, but my account helps make sense of it 
to some extent. One aspect of this directionality concerns the fact that 
people have limited powers to waive our duty to observe constraints 
against harming them. My account helps make sense of this power, be-
cause, as I explained above, it helps account for constraints’ exceptions 
for harm to people who consent to being harmed. But another aspect of 
this directionality concerns the fact that people have authority to demand 
that we observe constraints against harming them. Such authority seems 
largely independent of the considerations I discuss; and so, to account for 
this authority, we must appeal to other claims about the nature and point 
of morality. For an overview of approaches to making sense of direction-
ality, see May 2015. For an account of the authority to demand compli-
ance with moral principles, see Darwall 2006. For discussion of the role 
that social practices play in conferring such authority, see Darby 2009.  
18 We seem permitted be untrustworthy in limited respects, not only 
when we compete for scarce resources, like jobs, but also, for example, 
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Generally, being worthy of people’s civic trust is a condition for 
living with them in a form of harmony that characterizes permis-
sible interaction. But this claim has an important caveat: in certain 
forms of competition, people can interact harmoniously, despite 
being untrustworthy in limited respects, because their outward 
conflict manifests some more fundamental unity. In other words, 
harmony and trustworthiness can come apart, to some degree, in 
such cases, and so people engaged in relevant forms of competi-
tion are permitted to act in ways that make them untrustworthy in 
limited respects.  
I can explain how this applies to permissible competition for 
scarce goods if I briefly describe the conditions under which such 
competition often occurs. People pursue an enormous variety of 
projects. But there are not enough resources available for everyone 
to achieve all of her reasonable aims, and, morally speaking, no 
member of a society has a greater claim on that society’s resources 
than any other member, other things equal. So everyone has deci-
sive reason to adopt some fair procedure for distributing her socie-
ty’s resources, even though – crucially – this may sometimes re-
sult in other people’s acquiring goods that she wants or needs.  
Competition, together with limited forms of untrustworthiness 
that may accompany it, can be unobjectionable on my account if it 
is part of some fair, efficient procedure for distributing a society’s 
scarce resources. Provided that competition for jobs in Smith’s 
community is fair and efficient, Smith’s applying for jobs is, 
among other things, a reasonable way to promote an aim that he 
and other applicants have decisive reason to share: distributing 
their society’s resources fairly. And promoting an aim that others 
share, or have decisive reason to share, is one way of being in 
harmony with them. To be sure, Smith’s willingness to apply for 
jobs gives other applicants reason to distrust him in limited re-
spects, but the conflict between Smith and his rivals rests on an 
                                                                                                             
when we play competitive games. Since I do not have space to discuss all 
forms of permissible competition here, I will focus on competition for 
scarce resources, which seems less tractable than other forms. 
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underlying harmony grounded in their sharing, or having decisive 
reason to share, a single aim.19  
To be clear, these considerations make room for permissible com-
petition, but they do not justify permissions to violate the con-
straints I described above. I have argued that a person is permitted 
to act in ways that make her untrustworthy in limited respects, 
provided that her behavior promotes aims that all affected parties 
share, or have decisive reason to share. But when someone delib-
erately harms another person without consent, even if the harm is 
necessary to promote the good, he does not thereby promote any 
aim that he and his victim share, or should share, when the harm 
occurs. Of course, both agent and victim have reason to promote 
the good, but this reason is not decisive when the harm occurs – it 
is certainly not decisive for the victim. Rather, the victim has suffi-
cient reason to promote her private interests, and when the agent 
tries to sacrifice those interests for the good, it is appropriate for 
her to resist, flee, and so on. So, unlike someone who is merely 
willing to compete for scarce goods, someone who is willing to 
harm people without consent, whether to promote his own aims or 
to promote the good, is untrustworthy in a sense that prevents him 
from living in harmony with others. 
4 
4.1 Now I can more clearly describe the rationale for constraints 
that I wish to defend. This rationale rests on the view that when 
someone observes moral requirements, she thereby lives in a kind 
of harmony with other people, provided that these people pursue 
reasonable aims by reasonable means. To be clear, this does not 
mean that someone who acts rightly lives in harmony with those 
who show callous disregard for others’ interests; to the contrary, if 
someone, say, organizes a boycott to disrupt operations at a facto-
ry whose owners cruelly exploit their workers, then her actions 
may be both morally admirable and fundamentally discordant 
with the owners’ aims. Rather, the view states that when someone 
observes moral requirements, she thereby lives in a kind of har-
mony with people who respond not only to reasons to promote 
                                                 
19 Allan Wood (1999: 169-170) offers a similar account of how Kant’s 
Kingdom of Ends formulation of the Categorical Imperative can accom-
modate permissible competition. 
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their own interests, but also to reasons to promote or protect oth-
ers’ interests.  
This view about the relation between moral principles and inter-
personal harmony is not part of an analysis of what we mean when 
we use terms like “moral principle”; rather, it is a moral judgement 
about one characteristic that the correct moral principles possess. 
Though I cannot provide a complete defense of this judgment 
here, I do present, in the course of my discussion, three considera-
tions that support it. First, to make the intuitive appeal of this 
judgment more apparent, I will survey, in this section, some prom-
inent moral theories, all of which adopt some version of the judg-
ment, despite their substantial first-order disagreement about 
which behaviors are permissible, and their substantial metaethical 
disagreement about how our first-order judgments are justified. 
Second, also in this section, I will provide grounds for the judg-
ment by appealing to claims about the character of people’s inter-
dependence, and about the significance of the view that each per-
son is, in some sense, just one among others. Third, my particular 
interpretation of this judgment derives support from the role it 
plays in achieving reflective equilibrium among considered judg-
ments about the cases that I discussed in Section 2 and 3, the 
structural features of constraints that I discussed in Sections 1 and 
3, and the role that moral principles play in human life, which I 
will discuss below.   
4.2 The view that when someone observes moral principles, she 
thereby lives in a kind of harmony with others is accepted, in some 
form or other, by a broad range of moral philosophers. Among the 
most influential statements of this view is Kant’s Kingdom of Ends 
formulation of morality’s ultimate principle, which states that 
when someone acts morally, she observes principles that she 
would endorse if she were a member of “a merely possible king-
dom of ends” (Kant 1996a: 88). Kant describes this kingdom as “a 
systematic union of different rational beings through common 
laws”, a union “of rational beings as ends in themselves and of the 
ends of his own that each may set for himself” (Kant 1996a: 83). 
So, on Kant’s view, when people pursue their private aims within 
limits described by moral principles, their diverse aims are mutu-
ally supporting.   
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Contractualists also accept versions of this view. Contractualism 
states that someone acts rightly when and because she acts in ac-
cord with principles that any reasonable person would agree to 
adopt. On Thomas Nagel’s characterization of Contractualism, 
part of what makes certain moral principles correct is the fact that 
observing them would realize a form of “harmony among the aims 
and actions of distinct persons” (Nagel 1991: 46). And in his Con-
tractualist account of the reason-giving force of moral considera-
tions, T.M. Scanlon claims that charges of immorality are distress-
ing largely because of “their implication[s] for our relations with 
others, our sense of justifiability to or estrangement from them” 
(Scanlon 1998: 163). In other words, part of what is painful about 
someone’s recognition that she has acted wrongly is her sense that 
she has disrupted her harmonious relation to others.               
Mill’s account of moral motivation supplies another, importantly 
different, formulation of this view (Mill 1863: Ch. 3). Mill claims 
that acts are right insofar as they promote happiness, where no 
one’s happiness counts more or less than anyone else’s; and he 
states that a natural source of motivation to act rightly, on this un-
derstanding of right action, is “the desire to be in unity with our 
fellow creatures” (Mill 1863: Ch. 3, para. 10).  
This view that acting rightly involves living in some form of har-
mony with others makes sense, first of all, in light of the interde-
pendence of people’s lives. Of course, our lives are separate in one 
sense, because we often pursue our own private aims; but they are 
also interdependent in another important sense, because each per-
son is vulnerable to the influence of countless others, and no one 
can survive, much less flourish, alone. As children, we cannot sur-
vive without the support of parents or the goodwill of strangers, 
and as adults, we pursue complicated, demanding aims, often 
lacking the resources needed to achieve our aims without help. 
And even if someone manages to survive and achieve her main 
aims more or less on her own, she is unlikely to live a good life un-
less she shares that life with people she cares about. The view that 
when a good person observes moral requirements, she thereby 
lives in a kind of harmony with others is fitting, given that people 
depend on one another in these ways. 
This view also makes sense, given that moral principles must ac-
commodate the judgment that everyone is, in some sense, just one 
  
28 
 
person among others. Put another way, there are a staggering 
number of people on the planet, and their various interests and 
aims come into sharp and frequent conflict. Each person’s inter-
ests loom large from her own point of view, but, considered imper-
sonally, no one’s interests matter more or less than anyone else’s, 
other things equal. Sensitivity to the fact that everyone is, in this 
sense, equal is an essential feature of moral principles, and moral 
principles accommodate this equality largely by requiring each 
person to behave in ways that bring her life into some form of 
harmony with others’ lives. In other words, moral principles direct 
each person to limit her pursuit of her own aims in ways that bring 
her life into substantial harmony with other reasonable people’s 
lives. And limiting each person’s behavior this way – as opposed, 
say, to permitting her to pursue her own interests or the interests 
of people she cares about, without regard for others who may be 
affected – seems necessary for accommodating the judgment that 
each person is, in some sense, just one among others.  
4.3 The view that we live in a kind of harmony with others when 
we observe moral requirements helps provide a rationale for con-
straints and helps account for constraints’ reason-giving force, but 
only if we characterize this harmony in the right way. On one nat-
ural interpretation, which I reject, someone who acts morally lives 
in harmony with others by promoting the very same aim that eve-
ryone else promotes, or would promote if she were reasonable. Of 
course, there is no single, overriding aim that everyone actually 
promotes all the time. So this characterization of harmony is irrel-
evant, unless we assume that, all things considered, everyone al-
ways has decisive reason to promote a single, overriding aim, like 
the aim of producing the greatest good for the greatest number. 
But this assumption is intuitively implausible, and we need not 
accept it without argument. Instead, I accept the view that people 
sometimes have sufficient reason to pursue their private aims: 
reason to marry people they love, pursue careers they are passion-
ate about, or take up hobbies they enjoy, even if they could do 
more good for more people by doing something else instead. On 
this alternative view, living in harmony with others cannot consist 
in promoting the same aim that everyone else promotes, or has 
decisive reason to promote, at all times. There is no such aim. Ra-
ther, it involves adopting and pursuing one’s own aims in ways 
that, in some sense, leave room for others to pursue their reasona-
ble aims, even when their aims differ from one’s own.       
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I argue that someone can live in this latter sort of harmony with 
others only if she is worthy of their civic trust. To be clear, it may 
be that, in addition to being trustworthy, she must also satisfy oth-
er conditions, for example, observing principles that no one could 
reasonably reject, or being disposed to make personal sacrifices to 
meet others’ basic needs. I find these additional suggestions plau-
sible, but, as I said above, I cannot provide a complete characteri-
zation of such harmony here. Rather, I argue that, whatever else 
someone must do to live in such harmony with others, she must be 
worthy of their civic trust.  
More precisely, when we consider what someone’s life in a com-
munity is like when she is worthy of civic trust, and what it is like 
when she is not, we can recognize that being worthy of such trust 
is a condition for living in the relevant sort of harmony with oth-
ers. Someone who is worthy of such trust acts and deliberates in 
ways that make it appropriate for others to take a walk in her 
neighborhood, sit beside her on a city bus, or ask her for direc-
tions, without fear. And she adopts and pursues her aims in ways 
that make it appropriate for others to pursue their reasonable 
aims openly, without guarding constantly against her learning 
where they are or what goods they possess, or guarding constantly 
against her using such knowledge in ways that hurt them. In short, 
it makes sense for people around her to adopt the sorts of attitudes 
and behaviors that not only make life in a community possible, but 
also make it worthwhile.   
By contrast, someone who is unworthy of such trust behaves in 
ways that make it appropriate for people to avoid her, or to worry 
that they will be harmed if they happen to pass her on the street or 
stand beside her in a crowded market. Or she may behave in ways 
that make it appropriate for them to pursue their aims in secret, or 
to rely on threats or vigilance to prevent her from using what she 
learns about them in ways that harm them. Such a person is es-
tranged from people around her, left to endure a profound form of 
isolation. 
Put another way, the sort of harmony that characterizes morally 
permissible interaction does not just consist in our managing to 
avoid, for the most part, getting in one another’s way; nor does it 
consist solely in our promoting one another’s wellbeing. Rather, it 
also essentially concerns the quality of our psychological lives. To 
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live in the relevant sort of harmony with other people, someone 
must behave in ways that do not make it inappropriate for those 
people to have certain forms of trust in her – in ways that do not 
make it inappropriate for them to be part of her community, or to 
pursue their various projects in an open, unguarded way. Life in 
any physical community, for example, a neighborhood or work-
place, that lacks this aspect of interpersonal harmony is obviously 
deeply impoverished. My point is that any conception of morally 
permissible interaction – that is, any conception of the moral 
community to which we should aspire – that overlooks this aspect 
of harmony is impoverished as well.20 It overlooks considerations 
that are vital for fully grasping what it means to live in morally 
significant harmony with others, and for fully appreciating the ap-
peal of such harmony.  
4.4 The view that one must be worthy of people’s civic trust in or-
der to live in the relevant sort of harmony with them is, first of all, 
pivotal to my rationale for constraints. When we interpret harmo-
ny in this way, we supply a link between the virtual platitude that 
anyone who observes moral requirements thereby lives in a kind 
of harmony with others, and the judgment that moral require-
ments include constraints. I argued above that, given that people 
sometimes reasonably pursue their private aims, rather than pro-
mote the good, we cannot be worthy of their civic trust if we are 
willing to do to them whatever is necessary to produce the best 
results. Rather, to be worthy of their civic trust, we must observe 
constraints against doing and intending harm to them, constraints 
that have the features I described in Sections 1 and 3. So, provided 
that moral principles must be such that anyone who observes 
them lives in substantial harmony with others, and provided that 
being worthy of people’s civic trust is a condition for living in such 
harmony with them, it follows that moral principles must include 
constraints with the features I described.  
Furthermore, the link between observing constraints, being trust-
worthy, and living in harmony with others helps account for con-
straints’ reason-giving force. As I said above, we can adopt two 
kinds of perspectives from which we can recognize what matters, 
and how we have reason to live. From the first, more personal per-
spective, our private interests loom large, and we can better appre-
                                                 
20 I am indebted to Geoffrey Sayre-McCord for this formulation.  
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ciate our reasons to devote some special attention to those private 
interests. But from the second, more detached perspective, we can 
better appreciate that there is some sense, central to the living of 
our lives, in which each of us is just one person among others – 
some sense in which everyone’s life is enormously important, and 
no one’s life is any more or less important than anyone else’s.21  
Given this background, the link between constraints, trust, and 
harmony helps account, in the following ways, for our reason to 
observe constraints. First, we have reason to guide and limit our 
conduct in ways that bring our lives into some form of harmony 
with other people’s lives – as opposed, say, to showing callous in-
difference to others’ lives – because this is part of responding ap-
propriately to a form of value that everyone’s life possesses; it is, in 
other words, part of recognizing and taking into account the fact 
that each of us is just one person among others. Second, we have 
reason to live with others in the particular form of harmony to 
which my account appeals – that is, reason to devote some special 
attention to our private aims, but do so in ways that leave room for 
others to pursue their reasonable aims – because this reconciles, 
to some degree, the two perspectives, which I just described, from 
which we determine how to live. By living in this form of harmony 
with others, we not only respond appropriately to a kind of value 
that everyone’s life possesses in equal measure, but also accom-
modate the fact that our private interests loom large from our own 
points of view.22 Third, part of living with people in this particular 
form of harmony is being worthy of their civic trust, or more pre-
cisely, having a character that makes it appropriate for them to live 
their lives openly, without being wary or fearful. When we are wor-
thy of such trust, we thereby enter, in a limited but important re-
spect, into a kind of community with others; but when we are un-
worthy of such trust, we are left to endure a profound form of iso-
lation. The appeal of entering into this form of community, and 
avoiding the relevant form of isolation, helps account for the force 
of our reason to observe the principles – including the constraints 
– adherence to which makes us worthy of civic trust.   
                                                 
21 See Nagel 1986: Ch. 9 and 1991: Chs. 1-5 and Scheffler 1994: Ch. 3. 
22 See Nagel 1991: Chs. 1-5. 
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4.5 We can most clearly articulate this account of the justification 
and reason-giving force of constraints when we assume that peo-
ple are deeply invested in their private interests, and so, strongly 
averse to being harmed for someone else’s sake. Now I want to 
consider, briefly, complications that arise when people’s attach-
ment to their private interests is somewhat attenuated.23 Imagine 
that everyone reasonably devotes some special attention to her 
private interests, but nevertheless accepts that, because these are 
just the interests of one person among others, they may be sacri-
ficed, on occasion, for the greater good. My account provides a ra-
tionale for constraints in this case, but these people’s attitudes 
may limit, in ways that seem plausible on reflection, both the 
range of behaviors that constraints prohibit and the reason-giving 
force of constraints. 
There are at least two senses in which such people might accept 
that their interests may be sacrificed. First, they might endorse 
having their interests sacrificed in certain cases; for example, they 
might endorse having their property seized for the greater good, 
though they object to having their bodies injured for that purpose. 
Suppose, for argument’s sake, that these attitudes are reasonable. 
In that case, these people may consent to having their property 
seized in some broad class of cases and thereby establish, in the 
manner I described above, a broad class of exceptions to con-
straints against maltreating them. But, to be clear, to be worthy of 
these people’s civic trust, one still has to observe constraints 
against maltreating them in other ways, to which they do not con-
sent. 
Second, even if these people object to having their interests sacri-
ficed, they may not care much whether the sacrifices occur. For 
example, it may be that they generally object to having limited 
portions of their land seized for the greater good; nevertheless, 
because of the strength of their concern for the general welfare 
and the character of their concern for their private property, they 
do not care much whether such land seizures occur. Suppose, 
again, that their attitudes are reasonable. In that case, it may be 
that the reason-giving force of constraints against seizing portions 
of these people’s land for the greater good is weaker, in some way, 
than it would be if they cared a great deal about avoiding such sei-
                                                 
23 An anonymous reviewer raised this issue.  
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zures. Roughly, the strength of these people’s aversion to having 
portions of their land seized may help determine the degree to 
which someone’s willingness to seize their land would make trust 
inappropriate, and undermine harmony. So, depending on how 
these considerations combine with other factors to determine the 
reason-giving force of moral principles – a topic I cannot address 
in detail here – the fact that these people do not care much wheth-
er portions of their land are seized may diminish, in some way, the 
reason-giving force of constraints against such seizures. This im-
plication seems plausible. Constraints serve partly to limit our 
pursuit of our own aims in ways that accommodate other reasona-
ble people’s pursuit of their aims, and so it seems plausible that 
constraints’ reason-giving force depends, in some way, on the de-
gree to which these people care about securing their private aims. 
5 
I will close by returning to a topic I raised in the introduction: the 
relation between my account of constraints and the accounts in the 
literature. As I said above, the main accounts in the literature have 
important shortcomings. My account, which emphasizes, in ways 
these other accounts do not, the role that observing constraints 
plays in our psychological lives, corrects for many of these short-
comings; and it does so in ways that help us better understand the 
justification and reason-giving force of constraints, and better un-
derstand the familiar conception of morality to which my account 
appeals. To be clear, I do not aim, in this section, to raise new crit-
icisms of accounts in the literature, but rather, to survey important 
criticisms that help clarify my account’s contribution to our under-
standing of constraints.  
Some accounts of constraints, including Rule Consequentialist ac-
counts, are instrumental – they state that we have reason to ob-
serve constraints because this is a means of producing desirable 
results. I believe this approach supplies part of the rationale for 
constraints, but I deny that our obligation to observe constraints 
depends mainly on the benefits we thereby produce. The differ-
ence between my approach and the instrumental one is clearest in 
cases where everyone’s accepting a permission to maltreat people 
in certain ways would have somewhat better results overall than 
everyone’s accepting constraints against such maltreatment. I 
have argued that we should observe those constraints adherence to 
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which is part of being worthy of civic trust. Because outcomes in 
which people are trustworthy are desirable, instrumental accounts 
can appeal, in their own way, to claims about the link between 
constraints and trust. But people’s trustworthiness is just one 
among many factors that make outcomes better. Outcomes might 
also be made better, say, by people’s happiness, or by their free-
dom to direct their own lives. So there are cases where people ob-
serve constraints, and are therefore worthy of civic trust, but they 
nevertheless fail to produce the best available results. In such cas-
es, my approach has more plausible implications than the instru-
mental approach.   
Returning to an earlier example, suppose it turns out that every-
one’s accepting a permission to detain without trial people who are 
suspected of having committed violent crimes would reduce the 
rate of violent crime, and thereby produce somewhat better results 
overall, than everyone’s accepting a constraint against such deten-
tions. In that case, instrumental accounts imply that such deten-
tions are permitted. By contrast, because our willingness to detain 
people in this way would make us unworthy of civic trust, my ac-
count implies, plausibly, that these detentions are prohibited. On 
my view, observing constraints is not just a matter of following 
principles adherence to which would have impersonally desirable 
results, or desirable results for people who observe them. Rather – 
and this point is crucial – it partly constitutes living in light of the 
recognition that, although each of us can reasonably devote some 
special attention to her private interests, each is, in one important 
sense, just one person among others.  
There are also non-instrumental accounts in the literature, but 
these accounts, like their instrumental counterparts, are, at best, 
substantially incomplete. The most influential of these accounts 
can be divided into three categories. First, some accounts, which 
focus on making sense of constraints’ agent-relativity, are poorly 
suited to make sense of constraints’ other, more nuanced features. 
For example, Warren Quinn, Frances Kamm, and Thomas Nagel 
each argue that the fact that we are required to observe constraints 
against mistreating one another is somehow explained by the fact 
that we all have a certain desirable moral status, namely, the sta-
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tus of inviolability, just in case we are so required.24 But even if 
this curious account succeeds, it seems only to justify the view that 
we should observe constraints of some sort of other; after all, our 
being subject to any one of several different sets of constraints 
would render us inviolable in some respect, and to some degree.25 
So, it seems, we must appeal to other considerations to determine 
whether constraints prohibit us from doing harm or intending it, 
and, especially, to make sense of constraints’ exceptions for per-
missible harm. These are among the issues my account address-
es.26 
Kant’s moral theory provides the basis of a second category of 
non-instrumental accounts.27 But Kant’s theory has important 
shortcomings, and any account that relies on Kant’s distinctive 
understanding of morality and rationality inherits these shortcom-
ings. Kant claims that, to see ourselves as rational agents, as op-
posed to slaves of external forces, we must view a certain formal 
principle, namely, the Categorical Imperative, as the fundamental 
principle of practical reasoning; and he argues that familiar moral 
principles may be derived from the Categorical Imperative. But, 
like many people, I believe that the formal considerations to which 
Kant appeals are, by themselves, too restricted to yield a plausible 
moral theory; in particular, they are too restricted to yield a plau-
sible account of the content of constraints.28 In contrast to this 
                                                 
24 See Quinn 1993a; Kamm 1996: Ch. 10 and 2007: Chs. 1, 5, and 8; and 
Nagel 1995: 83-93.  
25 For criticisms of this account, see Kagan 1991 and McNaughton and 
Rawling 1998. In Preston-Roedder 2014, I discuss the form of argument 
on which this account relies.    
26 Paul Hurley (2009; Ch. 6) defends another account in this category. 
Hurley’s account – which revises and extends Scheffler’s (1994: Chs. 2-3) 
rationale for moral permissions to promote one’s private aims – appeals 
to claims about the moral significance of the personal point of view in 
order to provide a rationale for constraints. If Hurley’s account succeeds, 
it makes the agent-relativity of constraints more intelligible; but it does 
not even purport to make sense of constraints’ more nuanced features.   
27 I focus on Kant’s statement of his views in the Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals. 
28 For recent discussion of this criticism, see Scanlon 2011: 117-126.    
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Kantian approach, my account rests on substantive moral judg-
ments about the relation someone bears to people when, and only 
when, she acts rightly.29  
Finally, Scanlon’s Contractualism provides the basis of a third type 
of non-instrumental account (Scanlon 1998: Chs. 4-5). Contractu-
alism’s central claim, which can be developed in many different 
ways, is that we act rightly when and because we act in accord with 
principles that may be justified to others on grounds they cannot 
reasonably reject. Contractualist accounts of constraints rest on 
the view that constraints may be justified on such grounds. Con-
tractualism, as Scanlon actually develops it, offers a striking con-
trast to Consequentialist thinking about right and wrong, largely 
because it stipulates two restrictions on the grounds that can justi-
fy moral principles: roughly, moral principles cannot be justified 
by claims about the impersonal value of outcomes, and they can-
not be justified by claims about the combined weight of different 
people’s reasons for preferring one principle to another (Scanlon 
1998: 218-223 and 229-241). Some argue that, largely in virtue of 
these restrictions, Scanlon’s view can provide a rationale for con-
straints.30 But I believe these restrictions are implausible – claims 
                                                 
29 Arthur Ripstein (2009: Chs. 1-2) develops a Kantian account of legal, 
as opposed to moral, constraints that appeals to Kant’s political philoso-
phy, rather than his moral philosophy; and one might think that Kant’s 
political philosophy can ground an account of moral constraints as well. I 
do not have space to discuss this approach in detail, but one of its limita-
tions is that Kant’s political philosophy excludes an entire category of 
considerations that are central to understanding moral constraints’ rea-
son-giving force. Kant’s political philosophy rests on his characterization 
of the relation we bear to one another when we observe just laws. For 
Kant, this relation consists solely in our limiting our outward conduct in 
ways that prevent us from getting in one another’s way in certain respects 
(Kant 1996b: 23-24). But, as I argued above, an adequate characteriza-
tion of the relation we bear to one another when we observe moral con-
straints focuses not only on our outward conduct, but also on our inner, 
psychological lives. We cannot fully grasp the sense in which observing 
moral constraints partly constitutes living in harmony with others – and 
so we cannot fully understand why observing those constraints is worth 
caring about – until we recognize, as my account does, that observing 
those constraints makes us worthy of certain forms of trust.  
30 See Kumar 1999: 304-309. Stephen Darwall claims that “it is well 
known that … constraints can be derived within Contractualism”, and he 
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about the impersonal value of outcomes, and about the number of 
people who may be helped or harmed by our behavior, are some-
times directly relevant to the rightness or wrongness of actions.31 
Unlike Scanlon’s view, and unlike accounts of constraints that de-
rive from it, my account accommodates the view that claims about 
impersonal value and claims about numbers are sometimes, by 
themselves, morally relevant. In other words, my account provides 
an alternative to Consequentialist thinking about constraints, but 
not, as Scanlon’s Contractualism does, by simply ruling out as in-
trinsically irrelevant two of the main factors to which Consequen-
tialist reasoning appeals. Rather, by appealing to judgments about 
the relation we bear to people just in case we act rightly, my ac-
count justifies limits on the ways these two factors help determine 
how we should act.  
In this brief survey of accounts of constraints in the literature, I 
have described, in outline, some important criticisms of the ac-
counts, and I have explained, in outline, how my account address-
es these criticisms. But, to be clear, I do not claim that all of the 
accounts in the literature should be rejected entirely. To the con-
trary, as I have said throughout, some of these accounts supply 
important parts of the rationale for constraints. Nor, for that mat-
ter, do I claim that all of the comprehensive moral theories from 
which these accounts derive should be rejected entirely. I have ar-
gued that our obligation to observe constraints makes sense in 
light of claims about morality’s nature and point, together with a 
claim about the kinds of aims we can reasonably pursue. But I be-
lieve that my account must, at the end of the day, be integrated 
into some more comprehensive understanding of morality, that is, 
into a theory or coherent set of theories that makes sense of con-
straints and provides rationales for other moral principles. It may 
be that my account should be integrated, say, into a substantially 
revised version of Kant’s theory, or into a version of Contractual-
ism that develops that theory’s main idea differently than Scanlon 
does. But I cannot address this complicated issue here. My aim has 
been, not to refute accounts of constraints in the literature or to 
                                                                                                             
attempts to give this approach “a deeper philosophical rationale” 
(Darwall 2006: 37). 
31 Parfit (2011: Ch. 21) develops this objection. 
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provide an alternative to comprehensive theories in the literature, 
but rather, to illuminate a certain value – namely, the value of civ-
ic trust – that we must appreciate in order to fully understand the 
justification and reason-giving force of constraints.32 I have argued 
that recognizing this value enables us to better understand con-
straints and to better understand what it means to live with others 
in the kind of harmony that, according to a familiar, deeply plausi-
ble view, characterizes morally permissible interaction. 
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